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Regulatory attention on Bitcoin & privacy techniques to counter

  • May 31, 2021May 31, 2021
  • by @_pretyflaco

Attention is both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, almost every Bitcoiner wants more adoption and welcomes any coverage that might attract one or two new users to Bitcoin. After all, the peaceful revolution to separate money and state can only succeed if more people join it. On the other hand, not all attention is equally helpful. When Wikileaks started accepting Bitcoin donations, Satoshi was concerned about the attention given to Bitcoin in 2011 and disappeared a short time later with the following penultimate words: 

“WikiLeaks has kicked the hornet’s nest, and the swarm is headed towards us.”

Satoshi Nakamoto

Today we know that the hornets went after Wikileaks (and continue to do so to this day). Bitcoin however, went on a honeymoon phase in which the network grew to a sizable strength with millions of users and institutional investors piling in. But this honeymoon phase is bound to end eventually.

In this article we will outline how increased attention to Bitcoin and accompanying regulation plans are creating an environment that is detrimental to user’s rights to financial privacy, and which Bitcoin tools to mitigate are available today.

While governments may accept that Bitcoin isn’t going away, it is extremely unlikely that they will embrace its Cypherpunk qualities of censorship resistance, financial privacy and inclusivity. More likely, they will exhaust all means to regulate the ecosystem in ways that aim to dilute Bitcoin’s censorship-resistance and put the financial privacy of Bitcoin users at risk.

Efforts to this end are already underway. The emergence of mining pools with blacklists that only want to accept compliant transactions into blocks gives an idea of how an attack on censorship-resistance could play out.

Playing right into this, are regulatory efforts, such as the recently published Financial Action Task Force draft (summary). It aims to undermine the pseudonymity of Bitcoin addresses with even broader collection of KYC data. What these regulatory domestication attempts have in common is that they attempt to exploit the public nature of the Bitcoin timechain by augmenting it with toxic honeypots of personal data.

Surveillance companies are enemies of a free society

Centralized service providers in the Bitcoin ecosystem are obliged to conform to AML / KYC regulations on a “best effort” basis and by implementing “reasonable procedures” to prevent money laundering.

Screenshot from https://support.bitvavo.com/l/en/article/icy22n424p-transaction-monitoring

The uncertainty about what “best effort” and “reasonable” exactly means is creating an environment where service providers are susceptible to the marketing of surveillance companies. These are positioning themselves as the silver bullet to regulatory compliance and consulting the service providers on “risk management” in ways that are overreaching and pre-compliant. Several companies with big marketing budgets have specialized in this kind of surveillance activity and built a business around selling on-chain snooping software and data.

Bitcoin is not anonymous, at least not by current majority default usage. The Bitcoin timechain is an open, transparent, pseudonymous public ledger accessible for anyone. It doesn’t contain any real world personal identity data, but the way Bitcoin is currently transacted by the majority of users makes it possible for observers to trace transactions and cluster addresses to entities. Should one of the addresses from a clustered entity make a transaction to a KYC exchange, the entire cluster, with all of its balances and transaction history, can be tied to a real world identity. Augmented with metadata acquired by KYC services, transactions and addresses can be mapped to identities, turning the pseudonymous timechain to a database of who owns what and who paid who. This is highly dangerous. With the latest big data analysis software, a government could sift through bulk financial data to create profiles of users, enforce a police state or engage in social engineering; criminals could seek out wealthy victims to target, companies could snoop on their employees spending behavior.

“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy”

                Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Privacy is a fundamental human right, essential to autonomy and the protection of human dignity, serving as the foundation upon which many other human rights are built. If intrusive surveillance companies are allowed to continue their malpractices with further adoption of Bitcoin, this could become a threat to personal safety, human dignity, the operation of a free market and ultimately, a free society.

“The way rights work is, the government has to justify its intrusion into your rights.”

Edward Snowden

Edward Snowden’s revelations have demonstrated that the right to privacy is not something humans can trust their governments to enforce. Weighed up against international terrorism, human rights have always drawn the short straw. The direction that international regulations led by FATF are headed prove once again that users cannot rely on institutions to protect their rights, that corporations and regulators cannot be trusted to safeguard the human right to privacy.

“We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any.”

Eric Hughes

Bitcoiners know that freedom is fought for and earned. Consequently, users need to take matters into their own hands and arm themselves with defensive technology and best practices to safeguard their privacy with free code. On paper, privacy is a human right. But in reality, it’s a human fight against ever more data and control obsessed corporations and authorities.

Discovery of Coinjoin

While traditional banking provides a fair amount of privacy by making identities and their transactions only known to the trusted third party, Bitcoin inherently separates identities from transactions which are public.

Image from Bitcoin Whitepaper

The data applied by surveillance companies and KYC exchanges aims to abolish the identity-transaction separation. To this end, they cluster addresses using the common input ownership heuristic, which is the assumption that if a transaction has more than one input then all those inputs are owned by the same entity. As of early 2021, very commonly this assumption is true, which is why surveillance companies can apply it successfully.

Thankfully, Satoshi designed Bitcoin in a way that the protocol holds solutions against surveillance attacks. Heuristics can only be meaningfully applied if they hold true significantly more often than not. When the number of false positives exceeds a certain threshold, the heuristic becomes unusable. In Bitcoin, this can be achieved by changing the way that users create transactions. The blueprint for this change was laid out by Gregory Maxwell in two BitcoinTalk posts (here & here). 

“This message describes a transaction style Bitcoin users can use to dramatically improve their privacy which I’ve been calling CoinJoin.”

Gregory Maxwell

In 2013, Maxwell proposed Coinjoin, a way of transacting Bitcoin that makes it difficult for observers to determine who paid who and which output belongs to whom. To that end, multiple spenders coordinate to combine multiple inputs into a single transaction. This happens completely trustless, meaning users always keep custody of their bitcoin and do not have to trust a third party.

Herein lies a key difference to custodial mixing services or tumblers, where users must trust that the third party they sent their bitcoin to is honest and sends another party’s coins back as agreed.

But even if the mixing service is well-intentioned and they send someone else’s coins, the coin’s history will remain attached to it, now traceable to the new owner.

In comparison with mixing services, Coinjoin is therefore clearly superior as it is more akin to melting many inputs to brand-new outputs, with each of their histories detached.

Lastly, no party must take custody of any other party’s coins and run the legal risk of being classified a money transmitter or virtual asset service provider – a classification that introduces the regulatory burden of being obliged to collect personal data and employ the above mentioned “best effort” to comply with AML laws.

Coinjoin transcations have been possible since day 1 of the protocol, but were limited due to their complexity, and only used by a few who understood the craft of rolling up transactions. However, there has always been a consensus that this type of transaction should be made easily accessible to a larger number of users as Bitcoin adoption progresses.

A bounty pool with the purpose of promoting research and development for Coinjoin (currently holding 30 BTC) attracted numerous developers to this task, and shortly thereafter, the first privacy-focused wallets emerged. In recent years, usability has steadily improved and Coinjoin has ousted custodial mixing services, establishing itself as the go-to technique in the best-practice repertoire of privacy-conscious users. The implementations most broadly in use are currently Joinmarket, Wasabi Wallet and Samourai Whirlpool (overview). All three enable users to coordinate equal-output Coinjoins to break links to transaction history and increase the fungibility of their bitcoin.

However, the increase in use of Coinjoins has caused a dystopic reaction from exchanges advised by surveillance companies. Since late 2019, there have been reports of exchanges creating friction for users who used Coinjoin, hassling them with questions about the source of funds, the reason for Coinjoin usage and demanding other accounts.

Coinjoins can reliably obfuscate the transaction history, but it is possible for an observer to identify that a specific output was involved in a Coinjoin by the multiparty equal-output transaction visible on-chain.

Screenshot from blockstream.info

There is no specific legal requirement in any jurisdiction to flag Coinjoin use or deny service to Coinjoin UTXOs. It is simply more convenient for legislators to enact vague regulations and keep the ecosystem guessing. This way, virtual asset service providers have to anticipate what might be against the law and, in order to minimize the risk of license revocation, implement much more restrictive policies.

“We completed our compliance review and determined to ban your account with Paxful as it’s beyond our risk-appetite. We understand your privacy concerns, but the substantial amount of funds from the Wasabi wallet is high-risk for Paxful.”

Paxful

If a legislator were to attempt to define when a Coinjoin transaction should be rejected, it would have to answer the question of how many hops must be between a supposedly sanctionable transaction and its transfer to a regulated exchange for the exchange to be allowed to service it or not. However, once such a definition takes place, everyone would know how many hops it would take to fall off the grid. Regulation would therefore be tantamount to an instruction to circumvent that very regulation. By keeping the rules vague, the legislator conveniently avoids this situation at the cost of blameless users, who, stigmatized for the use of best practices, find it more difficult to secure their right to personal data protection.

“For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good.”

Eric Hughes

At this point, it must be noted that privacy coins like Monero are in no way better off than Bitcoin transactions in this regard. According to the (flawed) logic applied for Coinjoin flagging, every Monero transaction would be flagged as conspicuous. After all, the problem is not a technical one, but a social one. The only way out of this mess is to collectively honor the need for financial privacy and stop playing with those, who don’t.

Make every spend a potential Payjoin

Another very promising tool in the fight for on-chain privacy is Payjoin. It is a special type of Coinjoin transaction between two parties where one party pays the other. The major benefit of a Payjoin transaction is that it is indistinguishable from regular transactions that surveillance companies apply the common-input ownership heuristic on, but in the case of Payjoin, the heuristic fails.

Screenshot of Payjoin transaction menu from JoinInBox GUI for Joinmarket on Raspiblitz

In a regular transaction surveillance companies assume that all inputs belong to the payer and cluster the sending addresses to the same entity. But this assumption is broken with a Payjoin, because here one input belongs to the payee. Since it is impossible to differentiate Payjoin transactions from regular transactions with multiple inputs, also called steganographic transactions, the most powerful heuristic employed by surveillance companies to deanonymize users is broken and becomes unusable if adopted more broadly.

Here, adoption doesn’t necessarily mean that users actually use Payjoin for every transaction – for the common-input ownership heuristic to become unusable it would theoretically be sufficient that enough wallets implement this feature in a way that it becomes probable that users could have potentially used it. If enough wallets adopt Payjoin, surveillance companies are forced to adjust the success probability of their heuristics to a degree that interpretation becomes ambiguous. 

The Bitcoin Wiki has a site that tracks adoption of Payjoin in wallets. Driving adoption for Payjoin is a particularly low-hanging fruit for more on-chain privacy as it doesn’t require that everyone uses it for everyone to profit from it.

Software Wallets with Payjoin Support, Screenshot from https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/PayJoin_adoption

Censorship-resistance is Bitcoin’s most important property that many other fundamental properties directly rely on, but censorship-resistance itself relies partly on fungibility. Breaking the common-input ownership heuristic would be a crucial win for more fungibility in Bitcoin, and consequently for all other Cypherpunk properties. Payjoin adoption made a big step forward when JoinMarket and BTCPayServer implemented it. If only a few more would follow, on-chain privacy could benefit asymmetrically.

Of course, the mere presence of the Payjoin option in wallets does not entirely suffice. It also needs to be used. In the next article we will therefore guide you through the process of setting up Payjoin as a BTCPayServer merchant and how, as a customer, you can Payjoin with JoinMarket.

Written by @_pretyflaco, thanks go out to @HillebrandMax and @fulmolightning for input and advice. Featured image from https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/index.php?curid=271660

Raspberry Pi Bitcoin Lightning Nodes

WHY BITCOIN CAN ONLY BE AS FREE OPEN SOURCE…

  • March 21, 2021March 22, 2021
  • by @_pretyflaco

A fundamental choice of Satoshi in the development of Bitcoin (that is rather rarely talked about) is the fact that Bitcoin is Free Open Source Software. Every cycle new users and developers become interested in Bitcoin and try to wrap their heads around it.

While software licensing and development process is not high up on the reading lists of rabbit hole entrants, it is not only important to the development of Bitcoin, but also crucial to the security of Bitcoin that users understand that Bitcoin’s security is a direct result of the freedoms granted by permissive free software licenses.

With the recent proliferation of Bitcoin software bundled in easy to use full node packages for non-technical ‘point & click’ users, the topic of why Bitcoin software must be free software is worth revisiting. The goal of this article is to lay out why Bitcoin can only be as Free Open Source Software and create awareness for the potential threat to the Bitcoin network that the widespread adoption of packaged Bitcoin software with non-permissive software licenses could pose.

“I’ve developed a new open source P2P e-cash system called Bitcoin.”

– Satoshi Nakamoto

On February 11th 2009 Satoshi announced Bitcoin to the forum of the P2P Foundation as “a new open source P2P e-cash system”. Up to that point, it was only the second mention of “open source” in Satoshi’s public correspondence, the first being in the release announcement of Bitcoin v0.1 to the Cryptography Mailing List a month earlier on January 8th 2009:

“Windows only for now. Open source C++ code is included.”

– Satoshi Nakamoto

The term “open source” was coined in 1998 by the Open Source Initiative, but the idea behind open source goes back to 1985 when Richard Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation. The focus is on what the recipient of software is permitted to do with the software.

“’Free software’ means software that respects users’ freedom and community. Roughly, it means that the users have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software.”

– The Free Software Foundation

Between then and now, the term “free software” all but disappeared and was more or less replaced by “open source”, which focuses on the practical consequences enabled by these licenses: surprisingly effective collaboration on software development. Even though the Bitcoin software is a prime example of free software, hardly anybody calls it that nowadays.

Instead, Bitcoin is mostly described as open source software – a term whose literal meaning does not convey the full meaning of the term and causes confusion among new Bitcoin developers. This is not to put any blame on anyone who uses the term “open source”, heck, even Satoshi himself preferred that label over “free software” when he announced it. However, and more importantly, the license he chose for the Bitcoin Software was a permissive free software license: the MIT License.

Verify by yourself

HOW DO BITCOINERS TRUST BITCOIN

When explaining Bitcoin to someone new, one of the early questions to answer is how Bitcoin users can trust the Bitcoin software, trust that it really does what it is supposed to do, that it doesn’t do anything else than what is supposed to do, and that it doesn’t have any malware that may, for example, steal user funds underhand.

The answer is: We don’t.

“Being open source means anyone can independently review the code. If it was closed source, nobody could verify the security. I think it’s essential for a program of this nature to be open source.”

— Satoshi Nakamoto

Bitcoin is Free Open Source Software after all and an important *part* of what that means is that the Bitcoin source code is not encrypted, hidden or exclusively available to a select few like in Closed Source Software; quite the contrary, it is open and publicly accessible for everyone to audit and reviewers are explicitly welcome to do so. This is a feature. Anyone can open the Bitcoin source code, read it, run it, review it and verify what the software does, that it does exactly that and nothing else than what it is supposed to do.

“Don’t trust, verify.”

Bitcoin Mantra

Many have done exactly that in the past 12 years: at the very most hackers have been looking for holes and weaknesses in the Bitcoin code, some of them motivated by the prospect of cashing in a huge prize money if they succeed in breaking Bitcoin; others to avoid such malicious exploitation that could mean a devastating blow for the network that they rely on and want to protect.

As a result, the Bitcoin code is (probably) the most reviewed code of all software in existence. If the source code was not available to the meticulous scrutiny and persistent review of countless examiners, no-one in their right mind would store any substantial economic amount, let alone $1 trillion, in Bitcoin.

“Open Source doesn’t just mean access to the source code.”

Open Source Initiative

But while the source code of Bitcoin being public is sufficient to describe Bitcoin as not Closed Source Software (CSS); public code is *not* a sufficient criterion to describe software as Open Source Software, even if the literal meaning of the term might imply just that.

Among developers it is widely known, that the term “open source” has poor semantics, as a misunderstanding arises whereby people think source code disclosure is enough to meet the open source criteria, when in fact it is not. To understand the meaning of Open Source, it is worth looking back at the origin of the term and why it came into existence.

“Open Source” was coined in 1998 in Palo Alto by the newly established Open Source Initiative (OSI). The declared intent for the neologism was to distinguish “the pragmatic, business-case grounds” that had motivated Netscape to publish their source code (with modification and redistribution permissive license) from the label “free software” that was older and advocated by the Free Software Foundation (FSF).

The open source movement was basically a fork of the free software movement, with the main factionalizing difference between the groups being the relationship to proprietary software. Advocates of the term open source are willing to coexist with proprietary software, while free software advocates maintain the vision that all software is a part of freedom of speech and that proprietary software is unethical, unjust and for some even outright evil.

OSI advocates therefore argued that the term “free software” was too loaded with “politics and philosophy” and that a less principled approach would attract more software users and developers.

So in essence, the rebranding of “free software” to “open source” can be described as a marketing stunt. A move that was soon regretted by OSI founder Bruce Perens for undermining the efforts of the Free Software Foundation.

“Most hackers know that Free Software and Open Source are just two words for the same thing. Unfortunately, though, Open Source has de-emphasized the importance of the freedoms involved in Free Software. It’s time for us to fix that. We must make it clear to the world that those freedoms are still important, and that software such as Linux would not be around without them.”

Bruce Perens (Founder of OSI, Author of the Open Source Definition)

IMPORTANCE FOR BITCOIN SOFTWARE

Leaving the historical anecdotes aside and focusing on the practical implications of the Open Source Definition and the Free Software Definition, it becomes apparent, that both definitions essentially require that the software license grants the same freedoms to its users, namely the freedom to study the software, to run the software, to modify the software and to share possibly modified copies of the software. (Minor differences disregarded for the sake of brevity and focus)

A major strengths of open source software lies in the collaborative nature of the development process. A unique collection of the most experienced and knowledgeable developers in the field have made Bitcoin Core the most trusted implementation in the space through years of collaborative work.

“Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”

– Eric S. Raymond

Open source development has proven to be the best remedy to buggy code as it leverages the power of the marketplace of ideas; by making the source code widely available for public testing, scrutiny, and experimentation, the process of bug discovery increases rapidly. This perk of open source development is especially crucial for Bitcoin – a software that seeks to be the base layer of a new global monetary system – an aspiration that hardly forgives bugs.

Open source projects are also more likely to attract reviewers. The motivation to audit code is a lot higher for developers if they are allowed to fix the bug they discovered without permission of the copyright owner, simply by forking the repository.

It is also worth noting, that the freedoms to modify and redistribute code gives open source developers the valuable strategic option to quit a project and move on to another without losing their code. If the code they wrote during an employment were not open source, the developer could not use the code that they themselves wrote in future projects without permission. By working on open source licensed software, the developer’s work becomes portable and past work is not lost.

Another benefit of Open Source is the decoupling of software from a single company. When a software is supported explicitly by one company, and the company goes out of business, then so too does the software. That’s not the case with open source. If a company that produces an Open Source software goes out of business, the code can be still used by others and if the license allows it, another company or community can take over and continue supporting the project. Open Source software is not bound to one single company; rather, it is free technology to be used and extended by anyone.

FREEDOM TO MODIFY AND REDISTRIBUTE IS CRITICAL FOR THE BITCOIN CONSENSUS MODEL

All of the above factors draw open source developers to Bitcoin, contribute to its technology enhancement and strengthen its security by increasing the amount of vigilant eyeballs on the code. This is existential for the quality of Bitcoin code given its aspirations and the socio-economic impact thereof.  But the security of the Bitcoin network does not only rely on impeccable code.

The consensus model of Bitcoin is based on users being able to freely choose the code that they are running on their nodes to determine the rules of the network. This requires that users have the freedom to choose the software that they run which can only be achieved if the Bitcoin software is free to modify.

However, since users usually don’t have the technical capabilities required to modify the Bitcoin software according to their preference themselves, they rely on developers to do it for them. This in turn requires that the license must also be permissive to redistribute the software modifications by the developers so users can choose which code to run on their nodes.

Bitcoin’s decentralization comes from the peer-to-peer network of sovereign full nodes that run free open source Bitcoin software. While Bitcoin Core is the technological steward of the protocol, this status is bestowed only by the voluntary actions of Bitcoin users. Bitcoin Core cannot unilaterally force changes to the consensus rules of the network. If they tried to push code without consensus, the repository could simply be forked as the project is free open source software with a permissive MIT License. Here, the permissive license of the software is the user’s insurance against developers acting out of consensus.

If the license were not permissive i.e. restricting modification and redistribution of the software, users would have to trust that developers never push out-of-consensus code. Furthermore, the possibility that the software could be forked provides a check on developers to adhere to the development principles of Bitcoin and address all concerns raised adequately.

BITCOIN FULL NODE PACKAGES

In recent years, especially since the advent of the Lightning Network, node package projects emerged that bundled the Bitcoin Core software with an ever growing number of useful Bitcoin software tools for users to run on dedicated hardware devices like Raspberry Pi, Odroid or Rock64. The development of node packages was pioneered by the Raspibolt guide, which provides a step-by-step manual to set up Bitcoin Core and LND from scratch.

Thanks to the excellent descriptions, Raspibolt is a great way to learn the basics of command line interface and, while challenging and not suitable for those who get easily frustrated with computers, fairly doable even for non-technical users.

More convenient is the RaspiBlitz, that originated from the Raspibolt. It is a convenient scripted node package for users who have a focus on security and are comfortable with using a terminal for advanced features. More importantly, the ease of setting up a node with Raspiblitz opened the gates for many new node runners and directly contributed to the decentralization and resilience of the Bitcoin network.

gold standard pic.twitter.com/lmqIvgk5Aa

— nix-bitcoin (@nixbitcoinorg) March 16, 2021

Both projects use the MIT License, which means they are free open source software and anyone is allowed to use the code, modify it, improve it and release it. This allowed the Raspiblitz developers to iterate on the pioneering work of the Raspibolt project and make running a node convenient for more users. It’s worth repeating that more users running a self-sovereign node and verifying transactions are an existential necessity for Bitcoin, so it’s not a stretch to conclude that the freedoms provided by the Raspibolt license paved the way for the emergence of Raspiblitz and directly strengthened the decentralization and resilience of the Bitcoin network as running a node became convenient for more users.

IMPORTANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE LICENSES FOR BITCOIN NODE PACKAGES

The example of Raspibolt and Raspiblitz illustrates how free software licenses help the advancement of the Bitcoin ecosystem by allowing developers to iterate on the findings and code of others. But there is a more fundamental importance of permissive licensing for Bitcoin node package software specific to Bitcoin that is rooted in the nature of the Bitcon consensus model which depends on users to have the freedom to choose the software they run on their nodes.

Creative Commons licenses, for example, are generally not suitable for software and it is the explicit recommendation of Creative Commons License creators that it should not be used for any software, let alone consensus-relevant Bitcoin infrastructure software.

Unfortunately, Bitcoin node packages with non-permissive Creative Commons Licenses that restrict modification and redistribution are a thing. These projects are popular mostly among non-technical point & click users who are not proficient in modifying code themselves and therefore heavily depend on developers to provide the right code to them. Dependence on developers is not a problem per se, but dependence without the insurance of free software licenses is.

Without the insurance that developers from the Bitcoin community could fork the project, the users of a CC licensed package are dependent on the project’s maintainers – not sovereigns, but customers – left with nothing but the right to drop the product when push comes to shove, as the CC License makes it impossible for other developers to even fork the repository without violating copyrights.

But running at the mercy of a project’s maintainer is antithetical to the core principle of self-sovereign Bitcoin users as it negates the assumption of free users that the Bitcoin consensus model is built upon. It is therefore important that users and developers are aware and understand the implications of the license they choose to run on their node. Especially less technical users should pay attention to their software’s license and demand packages with permissive licenses to avoid lock-in to a package.

After all, the quest for better monetization of open source Bitcoin software does not have to come at the cost of losing user sovereignty. Lightning node packages have low transaction fee wallets built-in that allow for novel monetization models with micropayments that are worth to explore and experiment with. Developers should not underestimate the willingness of a free user community to reciprocate  the gift of sovereignty empowering software and focus on making recurring donation options easy to use and customize. The dream of streaming money is possible today with the maturing of the Lightning Network and offers a solution to open source’s funding problem. Bitcoin node packages are ideally positioned to seize this opportunity in an elegant Bitcoin way. Theoretically, at least. It would be great to see it happen.

Special thanks to Kim Neunert and Kevin Ravensberg for their input. Featured raspberry pi image is from NEO GENESIS BITCOINIZATION, a love letter to the Bitcoin project and everyone pushing for it to reach it’s fullest potential.

Well here’s the drop. We present NEO GENESIS BITCOINIZATION.

Our love letter to the #bitcoin project and everyone pushing for it to reach it’s fullest potential.

You might have to frame-by-frame this one if you’re the type that’s gotta catch ‘em all. ;D pic.twitter.com/y3Bdpt7V2M

— ??????????? (@munnybadger) March 19, 2021

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